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Introduction
Innovation in information and communication technology (ICT) has been one of the key
drivers of economic globalization. As a result, the numbers of goods and services and,
therefore, cross-border data flows have been increasing at an exceptional speed. The
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Members have early on realized the importance
of establishing global rules by launching a work programme on electronic commerce in
1998. The WTO and, in particular, the Secretariat has been instrumental in keeping
the issue on the agenda, providing shared knowledge on the evolution of ICT-induced
advances and by defining concepts which also act as focal points for trade regulation.
Yet, we have witnessed that regulation has been late to address the dynamic market
realities and if regulation has occurred, it was driven rather by unilateral approaches
with limited international cooperation. Given the absence of progress in rule-making in
the WTO for some time now, the negotiators of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
have been tasked to fill the gap of writing the rule book for 21st century trade - rules that
would address needs resulting from an ever more integrated and data-driven economy.
The first PTA that had an electronic commerce provision was the Jordan-US PTA in
2000 and the first data flow provisions go back to the Korea-US PTA from 2007. So,
these types of provisions are a rather recent phenomenon in trade agreements.
This paper focuses on data-related provisions in PTAs to explore trends and patterns
over time. We ask whether we observe particular clusters and models that emerge and
related to this who are the ”rule-makers” in this area as well as who are the ”laggards”.
If PTAs are to be understood as ”laboratories” for global rule-making, then which gov-
ernments are pushing their regulatory ideas and templates?
The paper is organized as follows: First, we provide a short discussion on the litera-
ture that provides the backbone and rationale for the data collection. We then present
particular indicators aggregated from the data that attempt to capture various salient
dimensions of data-flow related provisions. This is followed by discussing trends over
time using these indicators, exploring the rule-makers through both textual analyses and
attention paid to different data-related design features. Finally, we graphically explore
bi-variate relationships that relate to potential explanations why we expect to see vari-
ation in PTA design in this domain. The paper ends by outlining possible next steps
research could pursue in this domain.
Literature
Various strands of literature in international relations and political-economy provide the
impetus for collecting and analyzing PTA design features - some of which address general
debates regarding the move towards more law, the relationship between multilateralism
and regionalism or on rule-making vs rule-taking, the role of diffusion and debates specific
to data flows and regulatory responses. Below, we map some of these debates.
The call for more fine-grained information on the content of international agreements
has been around for a while. Both, the legalization as well as the rational design (RD)
literatures (Goldstein et al. (2000), Koremenos et al. (2001)) provide useful guidance for
choosing the types of design features to focus on. Both literatures develop indicators and
propose measures to account for treaties’ scope, degree of obligation as well as flexibility
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features. In particular in the trade literature on PTAs, various indicators have been
further developed such as the concept of depth of an agreement which captures the degree
to which measures may lead to increased market integration (Du¨r et al., 2014) or various
types flexibility tools which allow for legally imposing barriers normally for a limited
period of time (e.g. Baccini et al. (2015)). How can we transfer these conceptualizations
when we analyze data-flow provisions as part of PTA provisions?
Another literature to which this paper speaks is the work on regime complexity
(Drezner (2007), Alter and Raustiala (2018)) usually defined as a set of non-hierarchical
overlapping institutions. The universe of PTAs with over 1000 agreements, where all
WTO Members are participating actors, serves as an interesting laboratory of how regime
complexity affects the behavior of states both in collaborate or conflictive fashions. Linked
to the concept of regime complexity is the emerging attention to diffusion drivers and
effects (Simmons et al. (2006), Gilardi (2012)). Why is it that states sign PTAs? What is
the role of competition with other trading nations and how does learning and mimicking
from neighboring countries impact this decision to engage in PTAs? Or is PTA signature
and the commitments a result of coercion by powerful states that aim to have their tem-
plates and models reflected in as many treaties as possible? Both, the regime complexity
theory and diffusion theory provide strong testimony to how international treaties are
interdependent and serve as a cautionary note on analyzing single agreements in isola-
tion of other treaties. Within the study of international institutions and international
trade, additional debates have emerged focusing on the actors theorizing about what
group of countries promote their own rules (rule-makers) and which ones are on the re-
ceiving end of global regulation (rule-takers). This work focuses on the conditions under
which rules diffuse using a mix of methods, including textual analyses (e.g. Alschner and
Skougarevskiy (2016)).
Finally, research on trade and data flows has in particular focused on the relationship
between the promotion of liberalization and a government’s objective to protect public
interests. While the early trade literature focused on various linkages such as trade
and human rights and trade and environment (e.g. Hafner-Burton (2005), Bernauer
and Nguyen (2015)), more recently with the ever growing market interdependence the
optimal protection of individual rights related to data protection have become more
central. Following the old idea of ”embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982), we are interested
in how liberalization in data flows related to trade and services goes hand in hand with
providing states with flexibility or escape instruments to protect citizen’s interest in terms
of privacy, and therefore pursuing social goals.
Design dimensions and related concepts
In recent years, research on trade agreements has made substantial progress by unpacking
the various design features in PTAs to explore variation across treaties (Du¨r et al., 2014).
We follow this work by zooming in on data-relevant provisions. The data presented be-
low is based on 74 single variables focusing, on the one hand, on the electronic commerce
chapters and, on the other hand, on data-relevant provisions in other PTA chapters,
including services, intellectual property rights and specific rules on ICT, big data, data
localization and similar content. The data is then aggregated to produce a number of
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indicators measuring various key dimensions derived from the literature discussion above.
Below, we briefly describe different concepts and the types of variables that we draw upon
to constructing these.
1. Scope: This concept measures the attention paid to data-related provisions. Scope
is different from depth as it does not capture the degree of obligation and commitment,
but rather provides information about the extent to which the topic is covered within
the agreement (see also Koremenos et al. (2001)). Therefore, we construct two different
measures for scope or coverage: Scope1 is the word count for the electronic commerce
chapter; Scope2 is the number of total provisions found in the electronic commerce chap-
ter. Scope1 has a maximum of 3206 words and the average value is 793. Scope2 is an
additive index which ranges from 0-74.
2. Depth (of Data Flow Facilitation): This measure comes closest to what in the liter-
ature is described as the depth of the agreement (Downs et al. (1996), Du¨r et al. (2014)).
In this case, depth is thought of in relation to commitments which tend to making trading
easier when data transfer is involved. Here we create an additive index of 17 variables
that include rules for easing trade and providing a regulatory environment to foster trade
in data; these range from free movement of data commitments, promoting paper-less
trading and electronic signatures, advocating self-regulation of the private sector to ab-
staining from data localization requirements. This additive indicator ranges from 0 to 17.
3. Flexibility : As the literature on international institutions suggests that deeper
commitments are also more flexible (Baccini et al., 2015), we constructed one indicator
that focuses on eight escape and flexibility measures that we detected in the agreements
texts. These include both general and specific exceptions to commitments as well as
reservations. The flexibility indicator ranges from 0 to 8.
4. Consumer protection: An important and more specific flexibility instrument con-
sists of explicitly foreseeing way to protect consumer interests. This indicator ranges from
0 to 4 and includes elements of individual rights in relation to data protection, internet
principles, data localization measures, or addressing spam.
5. Non-discrimination: This indicator measures how much attention treaty drafters
have directed to general principles related to non-discrimination, such as to treating do-
mestic and foreign actors equally as well as following the most-favorite nation (MFN)
clause. On top, we add references to the WTO commitments and the need for technol-
ogy neutrality. The higher the indicator, the more negotiators embed trade agreements
within the multilateral trading system aiming for more consistency across treaties (e.g.
see Allee and Elsig (2019)).The indicator ranges from 0 to 7.
6. Regulatory cooperation: The final indicator measures the degree to which treaty
drafters advocate various forms of regulatory cooperation. We compile commitment that
calls for cooperation on transparency, international alignment in regulatory fora, or work-
ing together on cyber security. In addition, we explore whether the treaty foresees working
groups or committees to implement electronic commerce commitments. This indicator is
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a proxy for how much regulatory cooperation is foreseen in the treaty text. The indicator
ranges from 0 to 13.
Describing trends and patterns
In this section we discuss briefly the evolution of PTAs over time. We provide some
descriptive statistics based on the indicators developed above, derive a better idea about
who the rule-makers are and explore a number of bivariate relations which are suggestive
about potential interdependence between design features, but also between treaty content
and domestic practice.
The first agreement referring to electronic commerce was signed in 2000. Therefore, we
deal with a rather novel issue area for trade regulation. There are no observations prior to
2000 while discussions within the WTO had been going on for a while. This is suggestive
to the possibility that governments have prioritized the multilateral arena, while then
slowly turning to PTAs either because of lack of progress in the WTO or because of
learning effects and development of various government strategies and potentially implicit
models.
Figure 1 below shows the steady increase of e-commerce provisions, e-commerce chap-
ters and provisions on free data flow both in absolute numbers as well as relative to the
number of PTAs signed per year.
Figure 1: The evolution of e-commerce and data flow regulation in PTAs, 2000-2018
Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
In total, we have identified 99 PTAs that have at least one data-related provision.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the different indicators outlined above and
confirms the notion of considerable heterogeneity among PTAs.
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Table 1: Summary statistics on the indicators
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Scope1 99 793.2041 669.2556 17 3206
Scope2 99 22.9697 10.52059 2 46
Depth 99 6.565657 3.52299 0 15
Flexibility 99 3.313131 2.160151 0 8
Consumer protection 99 1.606061 0.8785213 0 3
Non-discrimination 99 3.080808 1.724238 0 6
Regulatory cooperation 99 4.343434 2.7224 0 12
Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
In the following Figures, we zoom into a selection of indicators and illustrate their
evolution over time. Figure 2 shows the Scope1 indicator, which captures the number of
words related to the regulation of e-commerce and data flows. The median and range of
the count of words varies considerably over time. We also observe a number of outliers,
including Jordan-Singapore 2004, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
in 2006 and Australia-Japan 2015. The latter one is an outlier for that year but is following
an upward trend. We also observe large variation in the years 2016-2018.
Figure 2: The Scope1 indicator, 2000-2018
Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
In Figure 3 we show the second scope indicator, based on the number of provisions
related to the regulation of e-commerce and data flows. Again, we observe that scope
increases, however not gradually. In most years, we observe a considerable range of
provisions as well as a number of outliers. Compared to other PTAs signed in 2006,
CEFTA has only few provisions related to the regulations of e-commerce and data flows.
In 2007, the same is true for the PTA between Japan and Thailand. In contrast, the
Panama-US PTA in 2007 includes a rather large number of provisions on this topic.
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The PTA between Colombia and Costa Rica presents the top outlier in 2013, the PTA
between Central America and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) the bottom
outlier. Malaysia-Turkey and Canada-Ukraine present the two outliers in 2014 and 2016,
respectively.
Figure 3: The Scope2 indicator, 2000-2018
Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
Over time, we also observe an increase in the Depth (Data Flow Facilitation) indi-
cator (Figure 4). Following the above trend, the 2006 CEFTA agreement and the 2007
Japan-Thailand PTA indicate substantially shallower commitments than other agree-
ments in these respective years. The outliers having substantially deeper commitments
in 2013 than other agreements signed in that year are Colombia-Costa Rica as well as
Colombia-Panama, most likely inspired by their commitments in one of their recent trade
agreements with a rule-maker. In 2015, we observe in Mongolia’s first ever PTA with
Japan also deeper commitments in terms of data flow facilitation.
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Figure 4: The Depth indicator, 2000-2018
Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
Turning to our flexibility indicator (Figure 5), we observe that already between 2004
and 2008, PTAs included higher levels of flexibility. Again, CEFTA presents the outlier
in 2006 which is not surprising as it also scored low on scope and depth. The bottom
outlier in 2015 is the PTA between Canada and Ukraine which might be explained by
the low trade flows in goods and services with substantial data content between the two
countries. The top outlier in the same year is the PTA between Australia and Singapore,
which could be a result of two countries which usually deep agreements.
Figure 5: The Flexibility indicator, 2000-2018
Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
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Of rule-makers and central actors
The previous sections discussed the various indicators and illustrated their variation over
time. In this section, we take a closer look at the signatory countries. In total, 82
countries (counting the EU as one actor) are involved in the 99 PTAs which have signed
treaties with data-flow related provisions since 2000. As illustrated in Figure 6, there is
considerable heterogeneity in terms of the number of PTA partners by singatory and the
degree of scope measured by the number of provisions. Since 2000, the EU has signed 18
PTAs with 38 partner countries and, on average, included 23 provisions on e-commerce
and data flows. Mongolia (MGN) has only signed one PTA (with Japan). In this PTA,
however, there are 40 provisions on e-commerce and data flows. The US has signed less
agreements than the EU, but on average their scope is substantially higher. We also
observe the average scope of agreements with European countries is significantly lower
than treaties with countries of the Americas. Oceania is also above average in terms
of scope. Finally, African signatories of PTAs are not yet addressing data-flow related
provisions.
Figure 6: The Scope2 indicator and the count of PTA partners
Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
To illustrate this network of PTAs, we combine the average Scope2 indicator and
the count of PTA partner countries for each signatory country and represent this in
Figure 7 below using instruments of network analysis. In this network, the size of each
country is proportional to its weighted centrality. That is, the size of each country is
proportional to the product of the number of PTA partners and the average number of
provisions on e-commerce and data flows included in all its PTAs. The width of the links
is proportional to the number of e-commerce and data flow provisions in a given PTA.
Figure 7 highlights that there are some countries that are central to this PTA network and
therefore potentially influential in diffusing certain regulatory models on e-e-commerce
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and data flows. What stand out are the European Union, the US and Singapore, but
also other countries, such as Australia, Canada or Mexico.
Figure 7: The network of PTAs regulating e-commerce and data flows
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Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
Note: Blue-Asia, White-Americas, Red-Europe, Green-Oceania.
To investigate the patterns that can be graphically observed in above network, we
zoom into the subset of PTAs that do not only have at least one provision on e-commerce
and data flows but a full chapter. Out of the 99 PTAs signed since 2000, 72 have a
chapter related to e-commerce and data flows. Seven of these PTAs are signed between
Latin American countries and only available in Spanish, leaving us with 63 PTAs that
are available in English language. Since Singapore and Australia renewed their PTA from
2003 in 2016, we only include the latter PTA in this analysis - leaving us with a subset
of 62 PTAs.
Relying on text-as-data analysis, we compare these 62 PTA chapters to detect po-
tential patterns. More precisely, we use the plagiarism software WCopyfind to measure
the textual overlap between the PTA chapters. The program allows for a number of
refinements. We follow the convention to use a minimum of six consecutive identical
words for a match (e.g. Allee and Lugg (2016), Allee et al. (2017a), Allee et al. (2017b)).
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All punctuation, outer punctuation, numbers, letter case and non-words are ignored. It
should be pointed out that WCopyfind only reports the PTAs that have a minimum of
matches between PTAs. In our case, the PTAs between Jordan and Singapore (2004),
Canada and Jordan (2009), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Viet Nam (2015)
and between Canada and the Ukraine (2016) appear to have to little overlap with the
other PTAs and were consequently dropped by the program.
The heat map (Figure 8) below provides a number of interesting insights. The darker
the red squares, the higher the textual overlap between the e-commerce and data flow
chapters of two respective PTAs. In Figure 8, the PTA chapters are hierarchically clus-
tered, meaning PTAs are grouped together into clusters. The clusters and their PTAs are
fairly distinct from each other and the PTAs within a cluster are broadly similar to each
other. Figure 8 suggests that there are five main clusters. The top right cluster includes
18 PTAs out of which the US is 11 times a signatory. Singapore is a signatory in 7 of these
18 PTAs. The second cluster in the center of Figure 8 includes six PTAs Australia is a
signatory of five of these PTAs, the sixth the PTA between New Zealand and Thailand in
2004. Down and to the left is another cluster that includes seven PTAs. Canada is a sig-
natory in 6 of these PTAs. The second last cluster includes the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP, 2016) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (CPTPP, 2018) as well as the United StatesMexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA,
2018). The other four PTAs in this cluster present PTAs in which at least one of the
signatories is a (CP)TPP member. The cluster in the left bottom corner includes the
nine PTAs of the EU which have a chapter dedicated to e-commerce and data flows.
Figure 8 confirms what the previous discussion has already hinted at: the US, Singa-
pore, Australia, Canada and the EU play central roles in this network. Furthermore, the
heat map suggests that their models are fairly distinct.
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Figure 8: A heat map on text-as-data analysis of e-commerce and data flow chapters in
PTAs
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Zooming in on the rule-makers
In this section we compare these rule-makers by focusing on the number of provisions
(Scope2) and differentiate provisions that have legal language that suggests little bind-
ingness and language that suggests a higher level of bindingness. The legal language
provides clues as to whether we expect more or less obligation based on words such as
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”should” or ”may”. We differentiate between high and low obligation. Figure 9 provides
an overview on the five rule-makers identified before. The Figure shows the average and
maximum count of total provisions as well as the average and maximum count of pro-
visions suggesting a higher level of bindingness. The maximum scores might be more
intuitive to interpret as countries potentially do not negotiate in their future agreements
commitments below the ones already agreed upon.
For scope and depth, we observe that for the so-called rule-maker group roughly half
of all commitments are phrased in legal terms that suggest high obligation. In terms of
the average and maximum values for scope and depth, the EU scores lower than the other
rule-makers as well as other countries.
We observe a similar pattern for the flexibility indicator. Of the rule-takers, it is in
particular Singapore which includes a considerable number of flexibility related provisions.
For the indicator related to consumer protection, we in particular observe that Sin-
gapore and Australia agree on legal language that signals higher obligation and therefore
allowing for stronger rights to protect individuals.
The non-discrimination provisions are overwhelmingly commitments which come with
high obligation based on the legal language. However, when we turn to regulatory co-
operation, we observe in particular that the legal wording suggest rather low level of
obligations, therefore are less easily enforceable in case of disagreement among PTA
members.
12
Figure 9: Dot plots for the indicators
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Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
Note: In the figure on non-discrimination provisions, High(max) is equal to All(max) for Australia,
the EU, Singapore, the US and Others which is why only the All(max) indicator is shown.
Exploring explanations for design
In this section we provide graphical descriptions of a number of bi-variate relations to
address potential explanations for variation in PTA design. The first group of graphs
(Figure 10) addresses the question as to whether PTA design is largely endogenous, in
other words, many of the design features are related to each other as suggested by some
the literature. We focus on the depth variable and explore how this is correlated with
other indicators. First, we see that scope and depth are highly correlated which is not
surprising. PTAs that are paying more attention to data-related issues are also deeper.
Second, deeper agreements are also going hand in hand with PTAs that advocate reg-
ulatory cooperation. This could also be interpreted as negotiators are forward-looking
promising to engage in regulatory discussion to accompany the fast changing regula-
tory environment. Deeper agreements are also more flexible, provide for more consumer
13
protection rights and non-discrimination clauses.
Figure 10: The Depth in relation to the other indicators
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Another set of explanations can be situated at the domestic level. To what degree
are domestic policies mirrored in international law commitments? Are countries using
international law as a commitment device to bring about domestic regulatory change or
are we rather witnessing a screening effect in which commitments largely reflect domestic
practice suggesting some cheap talk in relation to signing agreements (von Stein, 2005)?
Therefore below, we discuss how PTA design relates to domestic digital policies. We
rely on the recently published Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index (DTRI) by the Euro-
pean Centre For International Political Economy (ECIPE). The DTRI covers a range of
fiscal, establishment, data and trading restrictions related to digital trade for 64 economies
worldwide. The Index ranges between zero and one, where zero indicates a fully open dig-
ital economy and one indicates a virtually closed digital economy. Between the TAPED
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database and the DTRI, we have an overlap of 31 countries2. Figure 11 illustrates how
our six indicators relate to the DTRI. All indicators are negatively correlated with the
DTRI3. As for those indicators that are about scope, depth and various obligations a
negative correlation cast doubts about prima facie evidence that a commitment story is
at play here. More interesting are downward trends for flexibility and consumer protec-
tion, countries with lower restrictions aim for more flexibility, this would rather suggest
that these countries aim to keep policy space in this area, whereas countries with higher
restrictions paradoxically demand less flexibility providing some support for the idea of
a commitment device. Overall, we also observe that the rule-makers, with the exception
of the EU, are substantially above the trend lines.
Figure 11: PTAs and digital trade restrictiveness
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Source: Authors illustration based on the TAPED database.
2The relatively little overlap is due to the fact that the DTRI includes individual member states
which in TAPED are grouped as EU.
3Scope2: -0.2208, Depth: -0.2483, Flexibility: -0.0746, Consumer protection: -0.2892, Non-
discrimination: -0.2132, Regulatory cooperation: -0.2639.
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Conclusion and next steps
Data-flow provisions have entered the universe of PTAs in the past 15 years. Although,
only a third of all PTAs have commitments related to this area. This paper developed
a number of indicators related to PTA design and has mapped the design evolution over
time. Letting the data speak, we discovered a number of leading actors (rule-makers) and
sets of overlapping models of treaties based on textual analysis. However, we seem to be at
the beginning of a period where data-relevant provisions will only increase in importance
as many classical trade and trade-related provisions become relatively less important
(e.g. tariffs). What are the next steps in understanding design and design variation in
this domain? First, research may explore explanations to account for variation in design
based on political-economy models and arguments rooted in the IR literature. What role
play commitment concerns or power asymmetry in agreeing new rules? Which interest
groups are pivotal for pushing new rules? How does the competition between exporter
interests and consumer protection interests define government positions entering into PTA
negotiations? Second, research should pay more attention to the evolving competition
among models that are being developed, in particular starting with the TPP and how this
will affect the creation and promotion of other models (e.g. the EU). Are these models
complementary or are they creating regulatory barriers? Related to this how do leading
promoters of models use PTAs to diffuse their preferred models and what are the impacts
on non-PTA members when they negotiate PTAs. Also to what degree to new domestic
initiatives (e.g. EU General Data Protection Regulation) impact on PTA design and
the push for updating existing PTAs. Finally, what is the impact of these commitments
on state behavior, how do they assist in creating new domestic policies and laws on the
role of data in trade, how do they inhibit government action to restrict trade more in
light of consumer protection concerns? Also, more generally, how do these commitments
directly or indirectly impact on trade flows in goods and services and investment location
decisions for firms with large data components in their business models.
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